



3690 West Gandy Blvd #140, Tampa, Florida 33611

February 27, 2022

Re: Ukraine Supplemental

The Honorable James Inhofe
Chairman
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services
Russell Senate Building, Room 228
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

The Honorable Jack Reed
Ranking Member
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services
Russell Senate Building, Room 228
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050

The Honorable Adam Smith
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee
2216 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Michael Rogers
Ranking Member
House Armed Services Committee
2216 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Sirs:

On behalf of the Global SOF Foundation, the national military association for special operations, I write to urge Congress to expedite the approval and delivery of new military aid to Ukraine. The community of special operators with deep experience in this region are in real time contact with those fighting for their lives and country in Ukraine. Below is a specific recommendation for U.S. support based on the actual situation on the ground. The battle for freedom and democracy in Ukraine is happening now. The battle is at a critical stage now. Ukraine cannot afford to wait until mid March for the United States to send help. Congress must act now.

The window for doing easy things to help the Ukrainians has closed. Some nations, especially those who share a border with Russia, are rallying to support Ukraine with all manner of wartime supplies. The U.S. is coming in very late. Russia has committed a strategic blunder and is getting badly punished for their aggression by the Ukrainian people and armed forces. We should expect President Putin to escalate and intensify operations to bring the campaign to close on his terms. Ukraine is in an existential fight which if successful will send a defeated Russia back into its borders, thus speeding its decline into irrelevance on the international stage. We—the U.S. Government and people—need to do our part to enable the Ukrainians to be successful. This is the most consequential war since WWII because the outcome will shape international security structures for the next century, especially in Europe and Central Asia.

The most urgent needs are to resupply the Ukrainians to defend themselves against unrestricted Russian aggression. The Ukrainians Armed Forces and populace are fighting effectively in many places but are outnumbered and often out-gunned. The Russians have superior mobility and firepower but lack the essential local knowledge and the will to fight this fight. The maneuver phase of this is almost over; Russian maneuvers will stop when the major cities are surrounded and the eastern half of the Dnipro is (temporarily) secured. It will become attrition warfare after that. It is a matter of time before Kyiv runs out of ammunition, water, food, power, and civil necessities to keep society functioning.

IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL URGENT NEEDS.

When authorized by the U.S., provision of materiel and humanitarian support must be provided expeditiously to the point of need. Provisions should be provided to at least two distribution hubs—one in Poland and one in Romania. Once in Ukraine, responsibilities for distribution will revert to Ukrainian government authorities.

Onward movement via all available modes (ground, air, maritime) would proceed from there to forward distribution points in Ukraine. Routes through and over the Carpathian Mountains are open. The Polish land route remains viable as well to move supplies into the country via land, contract air, or some other method.

Combat operations are coming to a critical inflection point whereby both sides need to replenish stocks and supplies to the fighting forces and sustain the civilian populace for their everyday needs. The critical question for both sides is who will culminate logistically first, thus providing either the attacker or defender a substantial, if not decisive, advantage.

Ukrainian armed forces and territorial defenders must have enough combat power, materiel, and capabilities to accomplish the following military tasks:

- Deny Russian resupply of its forces in Ukraine, by either ground or air;
- Break Russian encirclement perimeters from either inside or outside to liberate its cities;
- Sustain the population's basic needs for the duration for the conflict;
- Prepare for a Russian occupation of all or parts of that will be opposed by resistance forces; and
- Expel Russian invasion forces from Ukraine's territory.

General Combat, Armed Forces and Supporting Territorial Forces Needs

- (1) Ammunition of the Soviet era for small arms, crew-served, and vehicle-mounted weapons.
- (2) Tank and artillery ammunition of various calibers.
- (3) Anti Tank munitions such as the Javelin missile and launchers with spare batteries, the AT-4, NLAW, and Karl Gustav weapon system.
- (4) Night vision devices to include individual night vision goggles and aiming devices, and night vision and thermal/infrared sights for crew-served weapons
- (5) Man-portable Stinger anti-aircraft systems and any other air defense capabilities available.
- (6) Secure, hand-held communications with base stations and spare batteries. Also, systems with Low Probability of Intercept /Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD) are most urgently needed.
- (7) Small tactical drones for troop and territorial defense use.
- (8) Individual protective equipment and clothing such as protective vests, helmets, load bearing equipment, individual first aid kits.
- (9) Field rations.
- (10) Field medical sets, kits, and outfits. At least one field hospital set, complete.

Supporting Command and Leadership.

- (1) Secure, long range communications base stations and associated antennas. Must include bandwidth for satellite channels.
- (2) Reconstitute the Ukrainian psychological operations facilities and capabilities destroyed in the opening Russian missile strikes.
- (3) Remote portable TV and radio transmission systems, such as "radio in a box" systems like those used in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

(4) Alternative secure internet and phone systems that do not rely on land-based communications cables transiting Russia.

(5) Create an information and broadcast center that can reach into Russia with factual information concerning Russia's aggression against Ukraine to counter the Kremlin's narrative. Provide a non-jammable/filterable source of real information with casualty information and reporting on human rights violations. This center may have to be offset in a third country to prevent interdiction.

Humanitarian Support.

(1) Ukraine

(a) Emergency communications equipment for rescue and recovery.

(b) Pioneer equipment, hand tools and sensors to include robotics.

(c) Urban rescue supplies and equipment.

(d) Temporary shelter material.

(e) Authorize use of Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance warehouse supplies and equipment.

(f) Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp sets and kits, to include power generation, communications, ablution units, and related supplies and services.

(2) Poland and Romania

(a) Refugee and Displaced Persons camp sets and kits, to include power generation, communications, ablution units, and related supplies and services. Provision of basic medical treatment and support.

(b) Logistical basing for receiving and distributing materiel from donor nations.

(c) Communications capabilities to link the logistical hubs to the global transportation networks.

Resistance Forces and Capabilities

(1) Authorize use of USG funds for supplies and equipment to arm and train Ukrainian resistance forces. Such provision will include lethal munitions, weapons, secure communications, and supporting equipment.

(2) Secure basing, infrastructure, and basic life support for developing, training, and supporting Ukrainian resistance forces.

(3) Individual clothing and equipment.

(4) Weapons and ammunition for training and employment.

(5) Secure communications.

(6) Transportation for ground, air, and maritime movement.

COORDINATION

Provision of the items described here must be executed as soon as possible given the exigencies of the moment. Excessive bureaucratic burdens and processes will potentially cause the provision of this support to arrive late to need or well after Russia has defeated Ukrainian forces in detail.

International coordination and deconfliction will be necessary in the near term. NATO has established an informal coordination center that works to deconflict the individual national contributions.

Fund the establishment of an international effort to coordinate, deconflict, and prioritize the distribution of materiel and support to Ukraine. Specific tasks for the "Multinational Coordination Centre" (MCC) include:

- Prevent duplication of efforts and supplies;
- Deconflict transportation for onward movement into Ukraine;
- Prioritize the support provided in the event there is a constrained transportation network and limited assets.

Fund the establishment, life support, manning, and communications for the MCC.

We understand that Congress is contemplating a supplemental package that could be added to the FY'22 appropriations package with an expectation to be signed by 11 March 2022. While this support is welcomed, the reality is that without immediate support, this fight will be doomed by then. Please work with all of your colleagues to achieve as quick a resolution to this supplemental as possible. Congress and all of our federal government needs to move at the speed of war if we wish to see democracy protected in Ukraine, and we should encourage our allies to do the same.

Sincerely,



Stuart W. Bradin
President and CEO

CC: Senator Joni Ernst; Senator Gary Peters; Representative Jim Langevin; Representative Elise Stefanik